Exploring the Evolution of Social Norms with a Supercomputer

Researchers from the RIKEN Center for Computational Science in Japan and the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology in Germany have unveiled novel insights into the evolution of social norms. Led by Dr. Yohsuke Murase and Dr. Christian Hilbe, the team utilized RIKEN's powerful Fugaku supercomputer to simulate the promotion and flux of social norms. Their findings, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, reveal significant implications for understanding cooperative behaviors and norms' lifespans.

Models centered on indirect reciprocity illustrate that social norms foster cooperation partly through the attainment of a positive reputation, which is beneficial for future interactions. For instance, people's charitable donations are motivated not just by altruism, but by a desire to elevate or maintain their social status. The specifics of how cooperation links to social status hinge on the prevailing social norm within a community.

Communities vary significantly in their expectations and evaluations of behavior. Some have stringent norms, while others are more lenient. Fascinatingly, the social norms themselves are subject to evolutionary processes—beneficial and efficiently enforceable norms tend to persist, whereas those offering little advantage are likely to vanish.

Applying evolutionary theory aids in understanding the dynamics of social norms, as successful ones proliferate, while less effective ones fade away. Previous research efforts were limited due to models allowing only a diminutive set of norms for pragmatic reasons. To overcome this constraint, the research group ran comprehensive computer simulations analyzing 2,080 "third-order norms," showcasing impressive results.

One key insight showed that sustaining cooperation is challenging within a single, well-mixed community, but becomes easier in sub-divided smaller communities. The most enduring norm identified simplictically deems cooperation as positive and defection as negative, except when defection curbs other defectors' harmful behavior.

Ultimately, this research elucidates the intricate interplay between social norms, reputation dynamics, and population structures, highlighting how social norms' stability and cooperative behaviors are significantly shaped by community architecture. This contributes to a broader comprehension of the evolutionary pathways of social cooperation fostering norms.

Earlier, SSP wrote about taking a trip to Mars's largest lake — Caralis Chaos.