Recent Supreme Court decision to undermine the role of science in US rulemaking

In a decision that has raised concerns among scientific groups, the U.S. Supreme Court has overturned a long-standing doctrine that granted federal agencies significant discretion in interpreting laws passed by Congress. This is reported by SSP.

The 6-to-3 ruling implies that judges will no longer defer to the scientific expertise of these agencies on various technical matters and will instead be responsible for making such determinations themselves. Chief Justice John Roberts, in the majority opinion of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a case involving environmental regulations for herring boats, emphasized that the courts, not agencies, possess the competence to resolve statutory ambiguities.

Those advocating for the maintenance of the Chevron doctrine—the term used to describe the now-overturned principle—are apprehensive that the nation's courts may not possess the necessary expertise to assume this role. The ruling, according to Sudip Parikh, CEO of AAAS, which publishes Science, will inevitably result in a shift in federal decision-making processes, ultimately impacting the utilization of scientific information in policymaking.

George Washington University law professor Emily Hammond also highlights the diminished value placed on scientific expertise, expressing concerns over the erasure of decades-long expectations regarding the relative competencies of agencies versus judges in making informed decisions on scientific matters.

Notwithstanding apprehension, the ruling has garnered support among conservatives, including prominent Republicans in Congress who welcomed the decision as an effort to rectify the alleged delegation of broad powers to unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats. Representative Jim Jordan, for instance, stated that the decision puts an end to a longstanding error and its consequences.

Originally established in the court's 1984 ruling in the case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the doctrine aimed to address issues related to the interpretation of laws governing power plants under the Clean Air Act. While the doctrine facilitated the resolution of disputes concerning government regulations affecting various sectors, today's ruling asserts its abandonment due to a law called the Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1946, designating the judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of federal law disputes.

Justice Elena Kagan, however, dissented strongly, characterizing the conservative majority's ruling as an illustration of "judicial hubris" and a case of power-seeking. Justice Kagan cited specific technical questions that she argued judges are ill-equipped to tackle, such as defining proteins in regulating biological products for the Food and Drug Administration and determining "distinct population segments" of endangered plants or animals for the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act. These, she contended, constituting typical Chevron questions, are better addressed by agency scientists with their expertise.

While the ruling maintains space for judges to seek external expertise, legal experts note that this may prove to be an inadequate substitute. The majority opinion assumes that by leveraging the input of agencies and amicus briefs filed by external entities, technical expertise can still be obtained. However, Michael Showalter of ArentFox Schiff indicates skepticism about the practical implementation of such an approach.

The conservative majority opinion further assumes that Congress will draft more precise statutes, reducing ambiguity to be resolved by the courts, particularly concerning environmental regulations. However, legal experts argue that this expectation may be unrealistic given the current deeply partisan political climate. According to Showalter, Congress has been woefully inadequate in modernizing existing laws, dampening the hope of enhanced clarity.

Importantly, some legislation intentionally includes ambiguity, enabling it to adapt to scientific advancements. Hammond questions whether judges will be able to keep pace with the literature in the same way agency scientists do as part of their job.

"The court has unfortunately undermined the appropriateness of deference," laments Hammond, adding that the belief that judges possess equal aptitude to agencies in making these critical decisions is disappointing.